Swine Flu: What They're Not Telling You

Excerpts: “Influenza [in pigs] is closely correlated with pig
density,” said a European Commission-funded researcher studying the
situation in Europe.[17]  As such, Europe’s rapidly intensifying pig
industry has been described in Science as “a recipe for
disaster.”[18]  Some researchers have speculated that the next
pandemic could arise out of “Europe’s crowded pig barns.”[19] Concern
over epidemic disease is so great that Danish laws have capped the
number of pigs per farm and put a ceiling on the total number of pigs
allowed to be raised in the country.[21]  No such limit exists in the
United States.

With massive concentrations of farm animals within which to mutate,
these new swine flu viruses in North America seem to be on an
evolutionary fast track, jumping and reassorting between species at an
unprecedented rate.[22]  This reassorting, Webster’s team concludes,
makes the 60 million strong U.S. pig population an “increasingly
important reservoir of viruses with human pandemic potential.”[23]

In the 1980s, more than 85 percent of all North Carolina pig farms had
fewer than 100 animals. By the end of the 1990s, operations confining
more than 1,000 animals controlled about 99 percent of the state’s
inventory.[12]  Given that the primary route of swine flu transmission
is thought to be the same as human flu—via droplets or aerosols of
infected nasal secretions[13]—it’s no wonder experts blame
overcrowding for the emergence of new flu virus mutants.

========= Full:

Swine Flu and Factory Farms: Fast Track to Disaster

by Michael Greger, M.D.

The H1N1 swine flu virus in North America currently concerning global
public health officials is not the first triple hybrid human/bird/pig
flu virus to be discovered.

First Found on a Factory Farm

The first was discovered in a North Carolina factory farm in 1998.
Since the 1918 pandemic, an H1N1 flu virus has circulated in pig
populations, becoming one of the most common causes of respiratory
disease on North American pig farms.[1]

In August 1998, however, a barking cough resounded throughout a North
Carolina pig farm in which all the thousands of breeding sows fell
ill. An aggressive H3N2 virus was discovered, the type of influenza
that had been circulating in humans since 1968.

Not only was this highly unusual—only a single strain of human virus
had ever previously been isolated from an American pig population—but
upon sequencing of the viral genome, researchers found that it was not
just a double reassortment (a hybrid of human and pig virus, for
example), but a never-before-described triple reassortment, a hybrid
of three viruses—a human virus, a pig virus, and a bird virus.[2]

Intensive Farming is the Problem

Dr. Robert Webster, one of the world’s leading experts of flu virus
evolution, blames the emergence of the 1998 virus on the “recently
evolving intensive farming practice in the USA, of raising pigs and
poultry in adjacent sheds with the same staff,” a practice he calls
“unsound.”[3]  “Within the swine population, we now have a mammalian-
adapted virus that is extremely promiscuous,” explained another
molecular virologist at the time, referring to the virus’s proclivity
to continue to snatch up genes from human flu viruses. “We could end
up with a dangerous virus.”[4]  This may indeed be what we are now
facing.

Within months of the 1998 emergence, the virus showed up in Texas,
Minnesota, and Iowa.[5]  Within a year, it had spread across the
United States.[6]  This rapid dissemination across the country has
been blamed on long-distance live animal transport.[7]

Long Way to Go

In the United States, pigs travel coast to coast. They can be bred in
North Carolina, fattened in the corn belt of Iowa, and slaughtered in
California.[8]  While this may reduce short-term costs for the pork
industry, the highly contagious nature of diseases like influenza
(perhaps made further infectious by the stresses of transport) needs
to be considered when calculating the true cost of long-distance live
animal transport.

What led to the emergence of the North Carolina strain in the first
place? What changed in the years leading up to 1998 that facilitated
the surfacing of such a unique strain? It is likely no coincidence
that the virus emerged in North Carolina, the home of the nation’s
largest pig farm. North Carolina has the densest pig population in
North America and reportedly boasts more than twice as many corporate
swine mega-factories as any other state.[9]

Agricultural Intensification

The year of emergence, 1998, was the year North Carolina’s pig
population hit ten million, up from two million just six years before.
[10]  At the same time, the number of hog farms was decreasing, from
15,000 in 1986 to 3,600 in 2000.[11]  How do five times more animals
fit on almost five times fewer farms? By crowding about 25 times more
pigs into each operation.

In the 1980s, more than 85 percent of all North Carolina pig farms had
fewer than 100 animals. By the end of the 1990s, operations confining
more than 1,000 animals controlled about 99 percent of the state’s
inventory.[12]  Given that the primary route of swine flu transmission
is thought to be the same as human flu—via droplets or aerosols of
infected nasal secretions[13]—it’s no wonder experts blame
overcrowding for the emergence of new flu virus mutants.

Starting in the early 1990s, the U.S. pig industry restructured itself
after Tyson’s profitable poultry model of massive industrial-sized
units. As a headline in the trade journal National Hog Farmer
announced, “Overcrowding Pigs Pays—If It’s Managed Properly.”[14]

Crowding Breeds Disease

The majority of U.S. pig farms now confine more than 5,000 animals
each. A veterinary pathologist from the University of Minnesota stated
the obvious in Science: “With a group of 5,000 animals, if a novel
virus shows up it will have more opportunity to replicate and
potentially spread than in a group of 100 pigs on a small farm.”[15]

Recent Outbreak

The swine flu virus discovered this week in California and Mexico
appears to be a quadruple reassortment virus incorporating genes from
human and avian flu viruses as well as North American and European
strains of swine flu. In Europe in 1993, a bird flu virus had adapted
to pigs, acquiring a few human flu virus genes, and infected two young
Dutch children, even displaying evidence of limited human-to-human
transmission.[16]

Recipe for Disaster

“Influenza [in pigs] is closely correlated with pig density,” said a
European Commission-funded researcher studying the situation in
Europe.
[17]  As such, Europe’s rapidly intensifying pig industry has been
described in Science as “a recipe for disaster.”[18]  Some researchers
have speculated that the next pandemic could arise out of “Europe’s
crowded pig barns.”[19]

The European Commission’s agricultural directorate warns that the
“concentration of production is giving rise to an increasing risk of
disease epidemics.”[20]  Concern over epidemic disease is so great
that Danish laws have capped the number of pigs per farm and put a
ceiling on the total number of pigs allowed to be raised in the
country.[21]  No such limit exists in the United States.

With massive concentrations of farm animals within which to mutate,
these new swine flu viruses in North America seem to be on an
evolutionary fast track, jumping and reassorting between species at an
unprecedented rate.[22]  This reassorting, Webster’s team concludes,
makes the 60 million strong U.S. pig population an “increasingly
important reservoir of viruses with human pandemic potential.”[23]
“We used to think that the only important source of genetic change in
swine influenza was in Southeast Asia,” said Christopher Olsen, a
molecular virologist at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Now, “we
need to look in our own backyard for where the next pandemic may
appear.”[24]

Dr. Michael Greger is director of Public Health and Animal Agriculture
in the farm animal welfare division of The Humane Society of the
United States. A physician specializing in clinical nutrition, Greger
focuses his work on the human health implications of intensive animal
agriculture, including the routine use of non-therapeutic antibiotics
and growth hormones in animals raised for food, and the public health
threats of industrial factory farms.

1 Zhou NN, Senne DA, Landgraf JS, et al. 1999. Genetic reassortment of
avian, swine, and human influenza A viruses in American pigs. Journal
of Virology 73:8851-6. http://birdflubook.org/resources/ZHOU8851.pdf.

2 Zhou NN, Senne DA, Landgraf JS, et al. 2000. Emergence of H3N2
reassortant influenza A viruses in North American pigs. Veterinary
Microbiology 74:47-58. http://birdflubook.org/resources/Zhou47.pdf.

3 Webster RG and Hulse DJ. 2004. Microbial adaptation and change:
avian influenza. Revue Scientifique et Technique 23(2):453-65.

4 Wuethrich B. 2003. Chasing the fickle swine flu. Science 299:1502-5.
http://birdflubook.org/resources/WUETHRICH1502.pdf.

5 Zhou NN, Senne DA, Landgraf JS, et al. 1999. Genetic reassortment of
avian, swine, and human influenza A viruses in American pigs. Journal
of Virology 73:8851-6. http://birdflubook.org/resources/ZHOU8851.pdf.

6 Webby RJ, Swenson SL, Krauss SL, Gerrish PJ, Goyal SM, and Webster
RG. 2000. Evolution of swine H3N2 influenza viruses in the United
States. Journal of Virology 74:8243-51.

7 Wuethrich B. 2003. Chasing the fickle swine flu. Science 299:1502-5.
http://birdflubook.org/resources/WUETHRICH1502.pdf.

8 Shields DA and Mathews KH Jr. 2003. Interstate livestock movements.
USDA Economic Research Service: Electronic Outlook Report from the
Economic Research Service, June. usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/
erssor/livestock/ldp-mbb/2003/ldp-m108-01.pdf.

9 Environmental Defense. 2000. Factory hog farming: the big picture.
November.http://environmentaldefense.org/
document…armingBigPicture.pdf.

10 Duke University Center on Globalization, Governance and
Competitiveness. 2006. Hog farming overview. February 23.
http://www.soc.duke.edu/NC_GlobalEconomy/hog/overview.php.

11 North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services.
2001. North Carolina agriculture overview. February 23.
http://ncagr.com/stats/general/livestoc.htm.

12 Wuethrich B. 2003. Chasing the fickle swine flu. Science
299:1502-5. http://BirdFluBook.org/resources/WUETHRICH1502.pdf.

13 Brown IH. 2000. The epidemiology and evolution of influenza viruses
in pigs. Veterinary Medicine 74:29-46. http://BirdFluBook.org/resources/Brown29.pdf.

14 1993. Overcrowding pigs pays-if it’s managed properly. National Hog
Farmer, November 15.

15 Wuethrich B. 2003. Chasing the fickle swine flu. Science
299:1502-5. http://BirdFluBook.org/resources/WUETHRICH1502.pdf.

16 Webster RG, Sharp GB, and Claas CJ. 1995. Interspecies transmission
of influenza viruses. Americal Journal of Respiratory and Critical
Care Medicine 152:525-30.

17 MacKenzie D. 1998. This little piggy fell ill. New Scientist,
September 12.

18 Ibid.

19 Delgado C, Rosegrant M, Steinfeld H, Ehui S, and Courbois C. 1999.
Livestock to 2020: the next food revolution. Food, Agriculture, and
the Environment Discussion Paper 28. For the International Food Policy
Research Institute, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations and the International Livestock Research Institute.
http://ifpri.org/2020/dp/dp28.pdf.

20 MacKenzie D. 1998. This little piggy fell ill. New Scientist,
September 12, p. 1818.

21 Ibid.

22 Wuethrich B. 2003. Chasing the fickle swine flu. Science
299:1502-5. http://birdflubook.org/resources/WUETHRICH1502.pdf.

23 Webby RJ, Rossow K, Erickson G, Sims Y, and Webster R. 2004.
Multiple lineages of antigenically and genetically diverse influenza A
virus co-circulate in the United States swine population. Virus
Research 103:67-73. http://BirdFluBook.org/resources/webby67.pdf.

24 Wuethrich B. 2003. Chasing the fickle swine flu. Science
299:1502-5. http://BirdFluBook.org/resources/WUETHRICH1502.pdf.

Article Source:
http://www.humanesociety.org/farm/news/ournews/swine_flu.html

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